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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, present signicant challenges for
policymakers at all levels of government. Since terrorism seems to present par-
ticularly acute risks for core urban areas, it may inuence economic and policy
decisions in ways that aect the spatial distribution of population and economic
activity. These impacts, however, will depend importantly on the assignment
of responsibilities among Federal, state, and local governments for dealing with
terrorism and on the distribution of the costs of these responsibilities. The pol-
icy interactions among dierent levels of government, and between the private
and the public sectors, should provide students of political economy with much
insight into the nature of the policy process in the American federation.1 Introduction
It is too early, by far, to arrive at a well-informed and balanced assessment
of the economic and policy consequences of the terrorist attacks of September
11. These events do, however, have potentially far-reaching implications for
urban areas in the US and throughout the world and deserve the attention of
economists interested in urban issues, local public nance, and related topics.
The following remarks seek to outline some of the potential economic and policy
eects and issues that arise in connection with these attacks.
To begin with, the possible eects of the attacks include both market and
policy responses. What happens to the market for real estate in lower Manhat-
tan, for example, is likely to depend importantly on the policies chosen by the
city government of New York, the state government, and the Federal govern-
ment. The city must divide its limited scal resources among many competing
demands, including the restoration of transportation capacity, urban social ser-
vices, and public safety. The state government of New York may or may not
inject large amounts of scal resources into the city government or into provi-
sion of public services for city residents. The Federal government may absorb
little, much, or all of the cost of demolition and rebuilding of damaged sites.
The policy responses of the city and state governments are likely to depend on
the behavior of the Federal government. In short, the terrorist attacks have
triggered a complex process of simultaneous adjustment in markets and in the
policies of several levels of government.
The policy adjustments made by dierent levels of government can be exam-
ined from a positive or predictive viewpoint as well as from a normative perspec-
tive. As is often (perhaps always) the case, useful normative analysis must build
at least partly on positive analysis. Whether and how the Federal government
should subsidize and regulate households, rms, and lower-level governments
depends on the ways in which these agents respond to policy choices. Much
of the discussion below is therefore devoted to a consideration of the incentives
facing market and public-sector decisionmakers in this environment.
One can hope that the terrorist attacks were a one-time aberration, and that
there will never again be individuals or groups that would wish to wreak such
destruction on civilian targets in the US or elsewhere. If this could be known
to be true, the eects of the September 11 attacks, on markets and on policies,
would derive from the destruction occasioned by these attacks themselves. These
eects would then be localized in nature, and probably somewhat transitory.
Unfortunately, terrorism cannot be expected to disappear spontaneously of
its own accord. At best, one might hope that active eorts by national security
authorities, both in the domestic and foreign arenas, might disable terrorist
groups and make it impossible for them to perpetrate major attacks in the
future. Of course, this points directly to some of the key policy issues to be
decided: what actions can governments take to forestall future attacks, how
eective will these actions be, how much will they cost, and what costs will or
should be incurred in an eort to eradicate or protect against terrorism? Experts
in domestic or international security aairs might somehow devise relatively
1costless means by which terrorism can be stopped, but it seems most probable
that the cost of fail-safe security would be prohibitive, and that the US and other
societies must therefore make dicult trade-os between cost and security.1 The
future, therefore, holds the realistic prospect of signicant costs to be incurred
in an eort to counter terrorism as well as the prospect that counter-terrorism
eorts will not succeed completely in stopping terrorist attacks. This at least
is the premise under which the following discussion proceeds, and it carries
important implications. It means, in particular, that minimization of the costs
of anti-terrorism policies is an important policy issue, that economic agents will
nevertheless have to operate in an economic system in which costly policies are
deployed, and that decisionmakers in both the private and the public sector can
be expected to contemplate the risks of future terrorist attacks, some of which
may result in signicant damage and loss of life.
2 Responses to Terrorism: Private, Local, Fed-
eral
Local governments operate in a market environment, and changes in market
conditions { population movements, economic development or decline, changes
in the size of local tax bases { aect both the demand for local public services
and the ability of local governments to nance their expenditures. They also
operate within a federal system in which the assignment of public-sector respon-
sibilities is divided among national, state, and local governments. These levels
of government are linked through systems of intergovernmental scal transfers
and regulatory structures. Furthermore, local governments operate in a spa-
tial context in which they compete with one another for productive resources.
The September 11 attacks a likely to trigger a complex series of adjustments
throughout this entire system of private and public decisionmaking.
2.1 The Direction of Market Forces
Most of the threats of future terrorism do not apply uniformly across space.
Even attacks involving contagion (smallpox, for example) would probably fall
most heavily on densely-populated urban areas, with much more limited eects
on remote locations, both because of reduced communicability and because of
lengthened response times in the event of an attack. Most of the other forms
of attack would also seem to pose much greater threats for high-density urban
areas. \Narrow" attacks directed at specic buildings or installations (perhaps
a major train station, a major oce building, or a particular tunnel) would
presumably focus on core urban areas or facilities of high symbolic importance.
Attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing, the rst World Trade Center attacks,
1There have been many studies, reports, and recommendations in the past decade that
have drawn attention to the threat of terrorism, as discussed in GAO (2001). The costs of
anti-terrorism and other security policies are indirectly revealed by the limited degree to which
these policies have actually been been implemented.
2and other similar terrorist actions are illustrative. Suburban strip malls, low-
density residential housing, and other rural/suburban locations are presumably
not likely targets of terrorist attacks. Given the vast number of such locations,
the probability of any one such location coming under attack by terrorists is
very small.
There is also, of course, the possibility of \broad" attacks that would aect
large areas within cities or perhaps entire regions. Radiological weapons (\dirty
bombs") have been mentioned as one means by which large areas of a city can
be contaminated. Anthrax may not be an eective weapon for mass killing, but
it appears quite feasible to contaminate buildings or possibly larger portions
of an urban center with enough anthrax to interrupt facility utilization. In an
era of heightened security awareness, there seems to be substantial potential to
disrupt urban life merely by communication of threats (for example, by leading
authorities or the public to believe that a particular building or bridge is about
to be destroyed). Let us assume, therefore, that core urban areas, prominent
transportation choke-points (bridges and tunnels), energy and communications
infrastructure (nuclear power plants, major nodes in natural-gas, electricity, and
telecommunications networks), and other high-prole facilities and locations are
now at increased risk of terrorist attack, or at least are believed to be so by
market participants. What incentives does this environment create?
Most obviously, the uneven spatial distribution of threats creates incentives
for spatial deconcentration. The very tallest oce buildings, the most visible
bridges and tunnels, the most prominent urban centers are made less attrac-
tive than would otherwise be the case. The tension between economies and
diseconomies of agglomeration is of course familiar to urban economists, as is
the role of transportation costs in shaping urban form. Standard urban and
regional models can be utilized to obtain predictions of the consequences of
changes in the productivity of urban centers relative to less central locations,
and of increases in the costs of urban transportation in general or via particular
modes.
Broadly speaking, threats to the security of life and property in urban core
areas, like commonplace urban crime, would be expected to lead to reductions
in the density of development, in land rents, and in employment, output, and
income in these areas. Relocation of economic activity and population to sub-
urbs, smaller urban areas, and to previously-undeveloped rural areas would have
the opposite eects in those regions. Furthermore, the micro-spatial structure
of urban areas may be aected by risks associated with particular forms of
transportation. For example, locations within metropolitan areas that depend
critically on bridge or tunnel links with few substitutes or on specic trans-
portation modes (especially xed-rail in areas with very high trac congestion)
would become less attractive relative to locations with many access routes.
In addition to these overall eects, the composition of economic activity
within urban areas would be expected to change as the comparative advantage
of central and peripheral locations varies. For example, urban oce towers
might be utilized by smaller numbers of employees, with more labor-intensive
tasks shifted to more remote locations.
3The adjustment of urban spatial structure is a costly process. Prices can
usually move faster than quantities, and asset prices, in particular, can respond
signicantly to shocks. Urban land and property values are likely to be early
indicators of any signicant reductions in the desirability of central locations. Of
course, reductions in asset prices can be very costly to asset owners, and they
may be motivated to lobby public-sector policymakers for protection against
windfall losses. Existing asset values reect market estimates both of current
and future economic fundamentals and of current and future policies. Some
initial indications of the price eects of the September 11 attacks are becoming
available. The situation in Manhattan is of particular interest, since the attacks
caused a signicant shock to the supply of oce space there. According to CB
Richard Ellis (2001a), approximately 30 million square feet of oce space { 8%
of Manhattan's total oce stock and more than 25% of the lower Manhattan
market { were destroyed or damaged as a result of the attacks.2 A strong
negative supply shock might be expected to tighten the market for oce space,
but it appears that the negative supply shock has been accompanied by an even
stronger negative demand shock, as the vacancy rate rose from 7.2% at the end
of August to 8.1% at the end of September and the average asking rent fell by
approximately 2%. The fact that rents have fallen does not necessarily mean
that asset prices have fallen, since a temporary reduction in rent may be oset
by increases in anticipated future rents.
2.2 Issues Facing Local Governments
Local governments play an important role in public safety and local transporta-
tion. Demand for additional public expenditures in these areas is likely to rise
as eorts are made to \harden" existing and future facilities and services and
to improve the capacity of police, re, and emergency-response institutions to
deter, detect, and respond to terrorist attacks. These additional expenditures
may to some extent be induced or mandated by higher-level governments and
to some extent may be driven by demands from local residents and rms. How
can such expenditures be nanced? There are several possibilities.
One possibility is to increase general local taxes, such as property taxes. In
addition to or perhaps instead of tax increases, local governments could increase
user charges, traditionally an important source of local nance in the US. For
example, users of public transportation could absorb the costs of additional
security personnel in the form of higher fares, and the owners of particularly
vulnerable buildings or plants could be required to pay for the nancing of
additional security patrols, hazardous-material remediation services, and the
like. A third possibility is to redirect public expenditures away from other uses
in order to increase security-related funding. A fourth option is to use local
regulations in order to shift the burden of expenditures to regulated households
and rms, for instance by prohibiting uses of land that are now perceived to
2In absolute terms, the lost oce space in lower Manhattan is approximately equal to the
total stock of oce space in the city of Miami and Dade Country, Florida (CB Richard Ellis,
2001b).
4be more hazardous or by requiring that property owners to install safety and
security features (security barriers, enhanced evacuation arrangements, greater
facility set-back requirements, re-suppression systems, etc.) that reduce the
need for the use of public-safety resources. Finally, transfers from higher-level
governments may be used to nance increased local public-safety expenditures.
As noted above, changes in market conditions aect the ability of govern-
ments to raise revenues. Just as high crime rates have contributed to a ow of
resources from central cities to suburbs, similarly the risk of terrorism in core
urban areas can lead to shifts in employment, investment, shopping, and other
taxable economic activity toward less densely-populated parts of metropolitan
areas. In the absence of support from higher-level governments, a combination
of higher demands for public safety coupled with reduced scal capacity would
force dicult choices on policymakers in urban centers and to scal incentives
that would work in the same direction as underlying market incentives, in favor
of movement away from higher-risk central locations toward more peripheral
locations and toward smaller metropolitan areas.
2.3 The Intergovernmental Dimension
Local governments depend heavily on higher-level governments for the nancing
of many of the services that they provide. Furthermore, the provision of public
services by Federal or state governments can relieve local governments of costs
that they would otherwise bear (i.e., higher-level governments can \crowd out"
local governments). The problem of terrorism, which raises issues ranging from
international relations and national defense down to the deployment of local
re and police personnel, presents a challenge for a federation like that of the
US. Students of federalism will watch with interest as the lines of responsibility
and assignment of expenditures and nancing among levels of government are
adjusted over time. To illustrate the intergovernmental dimensions of the public-
sector response to terrorism, the following paragraphs discuss selected current
and prospective Federal government policies.
Explicit Subsidies
To begin with, the Federal government has been called upon to provide
subsidies to a wide range of groups immediately aected by the September
11 attacks. Perhaps most noteworthy was the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, providing $15 billion in nancial relief for the airlines.3
Aside from subsidies to private-sector groups, there are many proposals for
scal transfers to subnational governments. Some of these are envisaged as
compensatory transfers to New York City and Washington DC. The city of
3This bill was passed by Congress 11 days after the attacks, a remarkably short time for
Congressional action. An instructive account of the political maneuvers leading to this bill
can be found in \Bailout Showed the Weight of a Mighty, and Fast-Acting, Lobby", New York
Times, Oct. 10, 2001.
5New York has estimated the total loss from the attacks, during the period 2001-
2002, to be in the range of $90{$105 billion (Oce of the Comptroller, 2001),
and political leaders from New York have asked for assistance from the Federal
government of more than $50 billion.
Other states and localities are likely to seek or be oered scal transfers
as accompaniments to various initiatives aimed at enhancing the capabilities of
state and local authorities in anti-terrorism activities. A variety of regulatory
approaches to the problem of terrorism can also be anticipated. New regulations
for security at airports and other transportation hubs, for businesses involved in
the production and use of hazardous materials, and for the coordination and con-
trol of emergency-response and public-safety systems are likely to be considered,
as well. Such policies are frequently accompanied by intergovernmental-grant
programs so that program costs are shared between Federal and subnational
governments. This issue is discussed further in Section 3.
Implicit Subsidies: Insurance
Recent policy debates and press reports have drawn attention to the problem
of \terrorism insurance" for buildings and other assets. The claim is made
that the losses suered by insurance companies in the event of an attack need
to be capped so that losses are not \excessive". If the Federal government
does not absorb such losses, insurers will be \unwilling" to provide insurance
against terrorist attacks and nancial institutions will be \unwilling" to oer
loans for building purchases in the absence of such insurance. These claims
can hardly be accepted at face value, and bear the hallmarks of crisis-oriented
political language intended to loosen public-sector purse strings.4 Nevertheless,
it seems quite possible that the costs of insurance in high-risk areas could rise
signicantly, and of course these costs would aect economic decisionmaking.
To the extent that the Federal government absorbs \terrorism risk", the
value of assets with signicant exposure to such risk is increased relative to
other assets, and activities with such risk achieve relatively higher rates of re-
turn. Since assets and activities with high terrorism risk are not distributed
uniformly over space, a Federal insurance program of this type, like well-known
Federal ood insurance programs, would be expected to result in higher levels
of economic development and activity in high-risk locations and industries. One
plausible policy dynamic would be for Federal policymakers to oer insurance
for the insurance industry, incurring contingent liabilities with little immedi-
ate budgetary consequences, to be followed by regulatory interventions to oset
various forms of moral hazard.
4According to a press report of November 27, PriceWaterhouseCoopers estimates that the
World Trade Center attack will cost insurers between $50{$80 billion. The editorial page
of the Wall Street Journal (Nov. 26, 2001), supporting Federal protection of the insurance
industry, asserts that industry capitalization amounts to about $300 billion, that \the risk of
more terrorist attacks cannot be quantied at the moment, thus premiums for terror coverage
can't be priced", and that \without insurance, the real estate, construction, and shipping
industries would be moribund". Comments of this sort seem to neglect the possibility that
insurance may simply become more expensive.
6Border Controls
Many urban areas in the US have large immigrant populations, and many
are heavily dependent on international commerce. This is true not only of the
major urban centers along the Atlantic, Pacic, and Gulf Coasts but of interior
cities as well. With attention now focused on external terrorist threats, border
controls { largely a Federal government responsibility { are receiving renewed
attention.
Achieving a high degree of control over the movement of people and com-
modities across national borders would be a dramatic departure from past prac-
tice in the US. According to recent government estimates (Oce of National
Drug Control Policy, 2000), annual consumption of cocaine in the US ranged
between 269 and 401 metric tons during the period 1988{1998. Almost all co-
caine is imported, and signicant eorts have been devoted during the past
decades to stopping the ow of cocaine into the country. To erect border con-
trols sucient to prevent the introduction of one or two tons of other contraband
(such as materials for biological or chemical weapons) would presumably impose
costs that vastly exceed those that have been devoted to the control of drug im-
ports. The same can be said concerning the movement of people. The number
of illegal immigrants in the US is estimated to number in the millions (gures of
5{7 million are commonly quoted), with annual inows of around 275,000 (INS
1996). US border controls, like those of many other countries, are evidently less
than fully eective. Of course, even limited border controls can sometimes stop
criminals; in one widely-reported instance, a planned terrorist attack during the
millennium celebrations was thwarted due to a border inspection. Nevertheless,
border controls that would reduce the number of illegal entrants into the US to,
say, fewer than 50,000 people per year would again impose costs well beyond
those incurred in the past.5
Border controls suciently stringent to create major new impediments to the
eorts of international terrorists would thus appear to entail signicant costs,
both in terms of direct expenditures by Federal authorities for enforcement of
customs and immigration policies and in terms of barriers to trade and immi-
gration. The impacts of such controls would likely fall dierentially on dierent
regions, urban areas, and sectors of the economy. Since state and local gov-
ernments play important roles in law enforcement, attempts to tighten border
controls are likely to entail additional costs for subnational governments as well,
a possible source of additional intergovernmental tension.
5Intensied eorts to monitor shipments into the US since September 11 may have the
side eect of inhibiting the importation of illegal drugs. Similarly, the number of illegal im-
migrants to the US could conceivably fall due to stricter border controls. The street price of
cocaine in coming months and years may provide a good indicator of the impact of border-
control enhancements, though of course there is some substitutability between cocaine and
domestically-produced drugs that would tend to dampen the price eect of a cocaine supply
disruption. The impact of tighter immigration restrictions would presumably be more di-
cult to detect except in certain sub-markets in which immigrant workers or consumers play
particularly important roles.
73 Issues for Further Analysis
The preceding discussion has outlined some of the possible directions of policy
response to the terrorist attacks. Policies are only now taking shape and serious
policy analysis will have to await future developments. The present section
identies just two of many possible topics that may warrant closer attention
from scholars and policy analysts.
3.1 Fiscal Competition in the New York Metropolitan
Area
Business and employment relocation from New York City to surrounding areas,
especially of institutions and activities associated with the nancial sector, has
been a frequent subject of discussion in recent years. Since the terrorist attacks
struck at the heart of the nancial district, the question naturally arises whether
they may trigger further exodus. In the short run, the destruction of impor-
tant oce real estate and the disruption of transportation and communications
infrastructure has led nancial-sector rms to shift some of their activities to
neighboring areas of New Jersey and Connecticut.6 In the longer term, it is
an open question whether there will be additional movement of nancial-sector
activity out of lower Manhattan into other areas, whether nearby or more dis-
tant. Local public policies, including scal policies, are among the factors that
inuence the locational decisions of rms and households.
Although scal competition has been studied quite intensively in the past
decade or so, the political economy underlying specic local economic develop-
ment initiatives is not well understood. Governments can of course compete
for new investment generally by oering a scal climate with low tax rates and
high levels of public expenditures that raise the rate of return on investment.
Many of these policies, such as corporation income taxes, local property taxes,
the quality of highway networks, and the prices of electricity and other public
utilities, are determined on a relatively uniform basis for broad categories of in-
vestment. Other policies seem to be more particularized: special tax incentives
for particular types of rms, special relocation-assistance services for individual
rms, and special infrastructure-improvement eorts are frequently applied on
a much more narrowly targeted and discretionary basis.
In designing scal and other business relocation incentives, economic devel-
opment authorities inevitably operate under budget constraints, although the
means by which these constraints are imposed may be rather opaque. One
6\In the eight days immediately [after 9/11], displaced companies snatched up more than
three million square feet of commercial real estate space in Northern New Jersey .... `Even in
a hot market, leasing that much space would normally occur over a six-month time frame,"'
according to a local real estate expert. See \Inux of NY Cos. Taxes NJ Infrastructure",
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 24, 2001. To put this gure into perspective, each of the two
towers contained 4.8 million gross square feet of oor area, and the entire World Trade Center
complex contained approximately 12 million square feet of oce space (see \World Trade
Center Fact Sheet", Minoru Yamasaki, Architects), and, as noted above, approximately 30
million square feet of oce space in lower Manhattan were damaged or destroyed.
8might hypothesize that development policies are designed to increase various
development indicators, such as investment, income, or employment, while lim-
iting scal losses from direct expenditures or foregone tax revenues. If so, and if
exogenous factors make a region or locality more attractive to new investment,
one might anticipate that the region might reduce the level of incentives oered.
The logic of such a response is similar to that found in models of strategic tax
competition. While policy reaction functions are dicult to characterize in gen-
eral (e.g., Wildasin (1991)), empirical studies such as Brueckner and Saavedra
(forthcoming), Buettner (2001), and others (see Brueckner (2001) for a survey)
have found that higher taxes in one locality result in capital outows and higher
tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions. In the case of New York City, the de-
struction of property has increased the demand for space in substitute locations
nearby, and it could therefore be in the interest of neighboring jurisdictions to
extract some of the (quasi-)rents resulting from this demand shift. Whether
such a response will in fact occur must be the subject for future empirical in-
vestigation, but the following remarks from a press report are suggestive:
\Neighboring cities and states, who have long sought to woo businesses away
from New York, don't want to be seen as taking advantage of a tragic situation.
A spokeswoman for the New Jersey Commerce and Economic Growth Commis-
sion, the state's chief economic-development agency, said: `We are not poaching,
and we have no intention of poaching or taking advantage of this in any way,
shape, or form whatsoever.' New Jersey isn't oering any new incentives to lure
tenants to the state, although since 1996 the state has oered relocating com-
panies grants equivalent to between 10% and 80% of their employees' income
taxes for as long as 10 years... Economic-development ocials in Connecticut
are bending over backwards to show they aren't trying to benet from the crisis.
While they are rushing to compile lists of available space, state ocials say that
they are discontinuing the use of many tax breaks and other economic incentives
they used to dangle in front of New York businesses. `Connecticut is standing
by to help, but not prot', said ... [the president of] the business council of
Southwestern Connecticut".7
3.2 Mandates: Funded or Unfunded?
Higher-level governments frequently impose regulatory constraints on subordi-
nate governments. A perennial question is whether these \mandates" should
be accompanied by nancial resources that would enable the regulated entities
to meet regulatory requirements. In its eorts to improve security throughout
the nation, the Federal government might insist on costly security upgrades for
subway systems, nuclear power plants, harbor and port facilities, and the like.
Will or should these mandates be subsidized by the Federal government?
One view of unfunded mandates is that they oer policymakers the op-
portunity to impose \undocumented" costs on regulated parties. To require a
7See \Can New York Successfully Retain Status as Global Financial Center?", Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 18, 2001.
9regulated individual or group to bear a particular burden is roughly equivalent
to imposing a personalized tax and using the revenue in a particular way. (For
instance, requiring a subway authority to install more secure ventilation sys-
tems would be equivalent to imposing a tax equal to the cost of those systems
and then paying for their installation.) On political economy grounds, unfunded
regulations can have important advantages to policymakers because they do not
appear in the scal accounts. This lack of transparency may of course make such
policies unappealing on normative grounds. On the other hand, mandates that
are \funded" are normally funded at the expense of taxpayers in general. They
dier from \unfunded" mandates not only in their visibility from an accounting
standpoint but also in the ways that they distribute the costs of compliance.
By way of illustration, an unfunded Federal mandate requiring cities to make
security improvements to all large bridges would impose no costs on cities lacking
in large bridges, such as those in inland locations, but would impose signicant
costs on cities with topographies that have made large bridges very important
elements of the local transportation network. Such policies would encourage
economic development in the former types of localities and discourage economic
development in the latter. Similar remarks would apply to policies that require
security improvements in port facilities near major urban centers but that im-
pose less stringent standards on facilities that expose fewer people to hazards in
the event of attacks. Alternatively, the Federal government could bear the en-
tire cost of all security upgrades in all locations. It might even attempt to oset
market-driven declines in economic activity (reductions in investment, employ-
ment, etc.) in areas with particularly high security risks by providing larger
subsidies to governments in those areas or by absorbing the costs of security
measures by assigning to itself certain functions that would otherwise have to
be provided and nanced at the local level.8
On eciency grounds, which of these outcomes is preferable? The use of
unfunded mandates would appear to create incentives for resources to ow from
uses that are costly to secure toward uses that are cheap to secure, whereas
the funding of mandates or, roughly equivalently, the upward reassignment of
public-sector functions, would protect the returns to resources that are uses in
higher-risk environments. Students of political economy will nd fertile ground
for analysis as the interests of private agents and of local and state governments
are brought to bear on Federal policymakers. The resolution of these political is-
sues will determine the spatial and sectoral distribution of the costs of improved
security, and thus, indirectly, the market-determined allocation of resources.
8To pose this issue in the context of airline security, imagine three alternatives: (i) a Federal
subsidy to airlines or airports to pay for personnel used in baggage inspection, (ii) a Federal
tax on tickets { or, better, on baggage { that would be used for the same purpose, or (iii) the
replacement of security personnel paid for by airlines with personnel paid for by the Federal
government. Note that this issue is distinct from that of determining the quality of baggage
inspection services, which could be required to meet high standards if desired.
104 Conclusion
The September 11 attacks struck at the heart of the nation's leading city, the
world's leading nancial center. It is impossible to know whether these attacks
will prove to be an isolated, one-time event or the rst of a series of assaults
on urban areas in the US and perhaps other countries. In any event, they will
inevitably trigger highly inter-related policy and economic adjustments. From
a normative viewpoint, it is important for society to respond to these attacks
and to the threat of future terrorism in way that are economically ecient and
that satisfy appropriate norms of fairness and equity. From a purely scientic
viewpoint, the evolution of policy in the aftermath of September 11 will oer
unique opportunities for public and urban economists to learn more about the
nature of urban economies and the workings of the federal system of government
in the United States. There is much fertile ground for additional research on
these issues, and much opportunity for this research to contribute to rational
discourse on policy and, ultimately, to better policy outcomes.
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